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THANASSIS BRAVOS
THE ALLIED NOTE OF 23rd SEPTEMBER 
AND GREAT BRITAIN’S RETREAT ON THE QUESTION 
OF EASTERN THRACE
On 23rd September 1922 the dramatic effort on the part of the Greek nation to 
achieve its national integration came to an end. After three days of stormy 
dispute and intense recrimination the Entente Powers decided to enter into 
negotiations with Mustapha Kemal (the Turkish Nationalist leader) with a view 
to producing an armistice, conceding to him, however, in advance, Eastern 
Thrace1, thus making the Turks once again absolute sovereign in Constantinople 
and the Straits. The news that Great Britain had yielded to all the Franco-Italian 
pressures, which concurred with Kemal's demands, caused an extreme response. 
The fact, in particular that the above-mentioned concession took place just after 
the British Prime Minister’s statement that the London Government would not 
agree to commit themselves as far as the Straits and Eastern Thrace2 were
1. Foreign Office (= F.O.) 371/7893, E 9783/27/44, Flardinge (British Ambassador) to Curzon 
(Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Paris, 23 September 1922; M. L. Smith, Ionian Vision: 
Greece in Asia Minor, 1918-1922, London 1973, p. 317. Nevertheless, before promising anything 
about Eastern Thrace, the British wanted at first to secure their interests, viz. to be assured about 
the neutral zones. D. Wälder, The Chanak Affair, London 1969, p. 308.
2. Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (= A.Y.E.), 1922, A/5/V1(2j), 3136, 
Ragavis (Greek Ambassador) to Foreign Ministry, London, 6 September 1922.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 05:00:10 |
180 THANASSIS BRAVOS
concerned, gave rise to a great deal of speculation about the viability of Lloyd 
George’s Government.
This surprise, which brought about Britain’s change in attitude, could not be 
considered unjustifiable: the well-known view of the British Prime Minister of 
the Greeks and the importance which he attributed to the fulfilment of their 
national aspirations had established London as the most ardent supporter of the 
enforcement of Sevres’ Treaty terms upon the defeated Turkey. Furthermore, the 
importance of the Straits for the maintenance of the Empire’s superiority over 
the Mediterranean Sea, thus safeguarding the lines of communication with India, 
drove Great Britain to support the Greek cause.
Not unreasonably, Lloyd George believed that a powerful Greek state could 
connect, like a channel, the heart of the Empire to its African colonies and those 
in the Near and Far East and that it would become one of the guarantees by which 
the main communication network of the Empire could be preserved3. Fie 
believed, furthermore, that maintaining such a valuable ally demanded, on 
Britain’s part, continuous friendship and uninterrupted assistance. He regarded 
the Greek people as the people of the future in the Eastern Mediterranean, since 
they were productive and full of dynamism and, in addition, they possessed all 
the most important islands of that sea, which could be potential (British) 
submarine bases of the future4.
On the other hand, the Straits, whether closed or open, could be used to keep 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the Mediterranean Sea. This line of action 
-pursued throughout the 19th century- demonstrated that the problem of the 
Straits was rather an Anglo-Russian problem than an Anglo-Turkish one. For 
that matter, Marshal Foch made it clear in a memorandum of his that the freedom 
of the Straits was “one of the principal fruits of the War” and for that reason he 
objected to the Turks being given control of the Straits5.
Given the afore-mentioned, Great Britain’s decision not to allow the Turks to 
cross Europe and land on Eastern Thrace, an act which would jeopardise her
3. A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/VI(i)), 2129, Ragavis to Foreign Ministry, London, 18 June 1922; Forthat 
reason he favoured the imperativeness of the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna. As Venizelos 
informed Em. Repoulis (acting Prime Minister) “[...] The British Prime Minister is determined to 
impose the Peace Treaty on Turkey in collaboration with Greece [...]”, A.Y.E., 1920, A/4 ,2948, 
Venizelos to acting Prime Minister, 15 June 1920.
4. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. V: The Aftermath, London 1929, p. 391.
5. Documents on British Foreign Policy (= D.B.F.P.), 1919-1939, First Series, XVIII (1922- 
1923), London 1970, Appendix I, p. 980.
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position in the Gallipoli peninsula, could be considered not only predictable but 
imperative; their move into Europe would cause the collapse of British post-war 
defence structure, since the control of the Straits -and consequently that of the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East base- had been the principal objective of 
the British Government. For that reason the latter, on 7 September decided that, 
whatever the events in Anatolia, Thrace would be Greek and Gallipoli Allied6, while 
on 11 September, that Government made it clear it was quite determined not to 
abandon the Gallipoli peninsula but, in addition, to keep Constantinople at all costs, 
even in the event of the Italians and the French refusing to make a common front 
with them7. However, as the Allied positions on the European side of the Straits 
would be in danger, if the Turks possessed the Asiatic side, it was decided the latter 
should be kept away from the territory opposite both Constantinople and the 
Gallipoli peninsula because, as Harington explained:
[...] with Nationalists’ guns, aircraft and rifles on the Asiatic side, we could not 
remain in Constantinople, neither could ships proceed through the Bosphorus or 
remain in anchorage8.
At that moment, the Greek army was selected once again -although provi­
sionally- to play an essential role: it was to be concentrated and reorganized in 
Eastern Thrace, so as to assist the Allied forces decisively in preventing the Turks 
from invading Europe9. That suggestion on the part of the British had been imposed 
by the circumstances10, since it was understood that the Greeks, by boosting their
6. B. C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in WestAsia, 1918-1923, NewYork 
1976, p. 342.
7. D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 21; After the statement of 16 September the War Office explained to 
Harington (Commander of the British troops at the Straits), thus: “The foundation of all our policy 
is the Gallipoli peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. For this reason it is of the highest 
importance that Chanak should be held effectively. Quite apart from its military importance it has 
now become a point of immense moral singificance to the prestige of the Empire [...] A blow at 
Chanak is a blow at Britain [...]”. D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 43; See also M. Kent., “British Policy, 
International Diplomacy and the Turkish Revolution”, International Journal of Turkish Studies, 
voi. 3 (Winter) 1985-1986, p. 43; M. L. Smith, op.cit., p. 316.
8. D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 23.
9. A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/Vl(4), 2947, Ragavis to Foreign Ministry, London, 6 September 1922; 
D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 33.
10. The proposal to retain Eastern Thrace the Greeks was not a new one; on the contrary was the 
most agreeable to Foreign Office on condition that Greece should renounce her claims upon Smyrna.
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morale as long as they acted with the Allies, would defend not only their territory 
but the Entente’s wounded prestige as well. Besides, according to Churchill:
[...] the re-entry of the Turks into Europe as conquerors [...] after all that had 
happened in the War, would signal the most humiliation of the Allies".
Undoubtedly, the above-mentioned plan fulfilled all the preconditions of 
success, taking into account the fact that Kemal -despite all his unreasonable 
demands- had not the power to take anything more than Asia Minor11 2. Without 
command of the sea he would not be able to transfer his troops to Eastern Thrace 
through the sea of Marmara, whilst it would be impossible to do so through the 
Boshporus, since Constantinople stood under Allied occupation. Furthermore, 
the Greek army would not be, in this case, far away from its base and supply lines 
-as had happened in Asia Minor- but inside its own country. Moreover, the 
Nationalists’ leader himself was convinced that crossing to Europe was impossi­
ble, because his army was worn out and very far from its base13.
In spite of the aforesaid, which made obvious the fact that the accomplishment 
of London’s objectives had been inevitably connected with the success of the 
Greek army - since “the hurried evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek army, 
would endanger British positions in Constantinople and Iraq, as well as at the 
Straits”14, the British Government conceded to the Turkish demands. Great Britain 
accepted the concession of Eastern Thrace to the Turks without a fight, in contrast 
to the previous decisions about the unacceptability of the Greek army’s withdrawal 
beyond Maritza river and the really interesting view about it: as the cheapest 
weapon, the Greek army could be the most effective advantage in the event that 
the Kemalists threatened Constantinople and landed on Gallipoli peninsula15.
Such a decision, of course, neither could nor should be considered as a result 
of only one factor or an outcome of hasty deliberation. The reasons are several: 
(a) the failure of the Greek army to impose the terms of the Treaty of Sevres upon
D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, vol. II, London 1938, pp. 1233-1234.
11. Churchill, op. cit. p. 419.
12. D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 10.
13. This Kemal’s view is quoted in S. Araloff s memoirs (Soviet Ambassador in Ankara from 
1922 to 1923) as they were published by Εστία (Athenian newspaper), 30 May 1980.
14. F.O. 371/7885, E 8873/27/44, Rumbold (High Commissioner) to Foreign Office, 
Constantinople, 4 September 1922.
15: F.O. 371/7886, E 9089/27/44, Foreign Office to Rumbold, 10 September 1922; D.B.F.P., 
XVIII, no. 34.
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the Nationalists, (b) the resurgence of Turkish power and the revival of its threat 
in combination with its relations with the communist regime in Soviet Russia, as 
well as the latter’s policy towards the Kemalists, (c) the continually close 
relations between France and Italy on the one hand and the Kemalists on the 
other -which finally caused the total breakdown of the supposed Entente’s 
common front, and the desertion of these two Powers-, (d) the hostile feelings 
with which not only British public opinion but also the Muslim populations of 
the Empire viewed a new war with Turkey, (e) the dangerous consequences of a 
new conflagration in the area of the oil-fields of Mesopotamia, and (f) the 
military weakness of the Empire, could all be regarded as factors responsible for 
the retreat of September 23. Therefore, the examination of these factors, as well 
as their interconnection, should be necessary; that is to say, the analysis of the 
needs, concerns and forces which formed this specific British decision.
Elowever violent the explosion of Turkish Nationalism was -after the brutal 
interference and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers- it 
would be very difficult to believe that the victors of World War I would submit 
to the demands of a defeated Turkey, if those victors were united. The dissension, 
however, between London and Paris about how they should face Germany, as 
well as the inconsistent policy about the division of the spoils in the Middle East, 
brought about such a break in the “Triple Entente” that France and Italy16 strove 
to undermine, in every possible way, the position of Great Britain in the Levant.
The split, indeed, between Great Britain and France constituted the most 
important factor for the British concession to the Nationalists. The latent breach 
with France over Germany radiated outwards throughout Europe to the borders, 
for French and British policies were most deeply and vitally opposed. The 
British need for the security of sea-communications implied instinctive 
opposition to any Power erecting a hegemony of force in Europe, while, in 
addition, the British need to trade implied a prosperous Germany. A prosperous 
Germany implied, in its turn, a politically stable and independent Germany. The 
creation of such a Government in that country was the essential and central 
requirement of British policy, the first condition on which the latter’s national 
recovery was dependent. Such a goal, however, was one to which French policy
16. Italy’s policy will not constitute an object of this study. It should be mentioned, however, 
that she followed the French anti-British policy, resented the way in which her Allies -and 
especially Great Britain- treated her after the end of war: they virtually revoked the Saint Jean de 
Maurienne Agreement (1 April 1917), about the territories of Asia Minor promised to her.
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and public opinion were deeply opposed. The grounds of this opposition were 
twofold. France needed to defend herself against the war of revenge which she 
feared Germany would undoubtedly organise, if this could be done with any 
prospect of success; France required immediate financial relief to save her 
national finances from bankruptcy17. These two demands combined, as vital and 
deep as British needs, could solidify French opinion at each recurrent crisis 
against the political and economic recovery of Germany - which the British on 
the whole were prepared to welcome. Nevertheless, neither of these demands 
were to be met, a fact that had the most negative consequences on the prompt and 
successful solution of the several problems which derived from the conflicting 
interests on the question of the proper settlement of the territories of the former 
Ottoman Empire.
The policy which Great Britain adopted immediately after the war was over18, 
changed the opinions on her that existed then in France19, caused much resentment 
and raised many questions about the usefulness of secret diplomacy followed at 
the time, and the diplomatic unity of the Allies20. The feeling that France had come 
off badly from the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, while Great Britain had 
taken all she wanted, was widespread. Franklin-Bouillon (Radical-Socialist 
deputy and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs), expressed -during the 
debate on the ratification of the Peace Treaty- this feeling as follows:
England had declared at the outset that she could not surrender her naval 
supremacy, whereupon this question, which had seemed likely to be the most 
difficult of all to settle between England and America, had simply vanished from
17. France found herself in a terrible situation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty for it 
left on her shoulders a debt of 175 billions of francs. As Briand (French statesman), however, said 
in an interview, given to a correspondent of the Journal, “People say that Germany will pay, but 
in the commissions dealing with this question, France has only one vote out of nine. The eight other 
parties, who have begun to resume commercial relations with Germany, will feel that it is to their 
interest not to weaken her. This means that France will receive but little”. F.O. 371/3752, 
120886/8259, G. Grahame (British Ambassador) to Curzon, Paris, 24 August 1919.
18. The good old era of Entente Cordiale was over. According to the British view, France was 
the Power Britain had most to fear in the future. As Lord Curzon warned: “She is powerful in almost 
all parts of the world, even round India”: W. Stivers, Supremacy and Oil. Iraq, Turkey and the 
Anglo-American world order, 1918-1930, New York 1982, p. 26.
19. F.O. 371/2937, no. 80, Bertie of Thame to A. J. Balfour, Paris, 21 February 1917; F.O. 
371/3219, 198213/no. 1654, Lord Derby to Foreign Office, Paris, 30 November 1918.
20. F.O. 371/3220, 168195/no. 1208, Lord Derby to Foreign Office, Paris, 6 October 1918.
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the programme. America declared that she could not live without the Monroe 
doctrine; everyone at once gave way on this point. Japan had threatened to 
withdraw from the Conference and refused to sign the treaty unless the 40 million 
Chinese of Shantung (a German colony) were handed over to her; the result was 
that, in the treaty creating the Society of Nations for the defence of the weak, the 
triumph of justice and the regeneration of the world, these 40 million men were 
duly handed over. What of France? France had presented the claims based on 
Marshal Foch’s famous memorandum of the 22nd February, formulating the 
essential requirements for her safety; her Allies, having got what they wanted, 
had declared those claims unacceptable. French diplomacy had failed21 [...].
This being the case, disagreements between France and her Allies were 
considered hostile actions towards her and they were explained on the grounds of 
jealousy and fear of “too great a France”22: (a) the rejection -on the part of the 
London Government, along with that of Washington- of the French claims for 
infinite control of the Rhine bridgeheads and the occupation of Rhineland as long 
as might be necessary, and the extension of this occupation up to the basin of the 
Ruhr-with its minerals and its factories- as military guarantees of French security, 
(b) the denial of offering guarantees to France against a resuscitated Germany, 
regardless of whether the United States would ratify the treaty of joint Anglo- 
American guarantee promised by Wilson and Lloyd George to Clemenceau in 
191923, (c) the objection of the British to the huge reparations demanded by the 
French24, and (d) the consistent and strong opposition of the former to France’s 
demand to hand over the industrial area of Upper Silesia25 to Poland26.
The British, for their part, refused to satisfy the French claims since any
21. F.O. 371/3752, 126386/8259, no. 872, G. Grahame to Curzon, Paris, 4 September 1919.
22. F.O. 371/3753, 181958/8259/17, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 27 February 1920.
23. F.O. 371/6998, W 9106/9106/17, Hardinge to Curzon, Paris, 22 August 1921.
24. At a meeting of the Supreme Council, held in Paris on the 26th J anuary 1921, convened to 
consider the reparation question, P. Doumer (the French Minister of Finance) estimated 
Germany’s total indebtedness as approximately 200 billions of gold marks. F.O. 371/8265, W 
1389/1389/17, Hardinge to Curzon, Annual Report on France, 1921, Paris, 11 February 1922.
25. Such allocation to Poland would, moreover, result in a wholesale exodus out of the disputed 
area of the skilled workmen, who were practically all German. This procedure seemed to be 
according to the French interests, since it was understood that the French Government thought it 
possible to replace the German experts, who would leave the country, by Frenchmen. F.O. 
371/5902, C 10337192/18, Foreign Office memorandum on Upper Silesia Plebiscite, 19May 1921.
26. F.O. 371/6995, W 6618/6298/17, Hardinge to Curzon, Paris, 3 June 1921; In order to be
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prolonged occupation of the Rhineland would leave France and Germany in a 
state which would be neither peace nor war27 -a state of affairs which could 
hardly lead to the recovery of the Continent-, and were strongly opposed not 
only to the reparation sums being fixed according to French demands, but also 
to their insistence of their payment, which would precipitate the crash of German 
economy. The City dreaded the prospect that the London finance houses, having 
financed German imports of food and raw materials, would have given their 
credits for nothing. This being the case, the British considered the moratorium 
on reparation payment an absolute necessity. The rationale for such a view was 
simple: the corollary was, if the German economy was broken, there would be a 
further violent depreciation of the franc, with the result that Great Britain would 
withdraw or curtail her credit to French enterprises, e.g. French railways. On the 
other hand, as far as Germany side was concerned, the German Government 
would make no further payments unless the Industrialists could find the 
necessary foreign exchange; the latter would only do that if they could receive 
credit in London; they could not, however, get credit there unless there was a 
moratorium, for London financiers regarded the position as hopeless28.
The most thorny problem, however, between the two allies remained the 
military guarantee, which was to be offered to France by Great Britain, against 
an unprovoked German attack. A feeling of insecurity prevailed among the 
French; and finally, found its expression in the proposal of a defence alliance 
between the two countries, which came to light as a result of an article in The 
Times of 3rd June 1921, regarding a possible Anglo-French alliance. The French
understandable the attitude of France on this question it would be necessary to be stated that Upper 
Silesia was a country richly endowed with minerals of various descriptions and of such value from 
a military point of view that General Ludendorff (Commander in chief, along with Hindeburg, of 
the Kaiserian army) in his book upon the Great War, described the mining areas of Upper Silesia 
as having made it possible for Germany to carry out a war of protracted duration, thereby, implying 
that without these districts it would be difficult for Germany to conduct a long war in the future. 
Public opinion and the French Government therefore resolutely set their minds of depriving 
Germany coûte que coûte of the industrial area of Upper Silesia, feeling that with control over the 
products of the Saar Valley, the industrial area of Upper Silesia in the hands of Poland and possibly 
with the Ruhr Valley in the hands or under the control of France, Germany would be deprived of 
all her rich industrial and mineral districts and would be helpless in the time of war. F.0.371/8265, 
W 1389/1389/17, op. cit.
27. F.O. 371/3753, 181165/8259/17, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 25 February 1920.
28. F.O. 371/6039, C 22814/2740/18, Waterlow’s memorandum on German reparation 
obligations and question of moratorium, 30 November 1921.
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did not lose the opportunity to bring before the British the question of closer co­
operation -in the form of alliance- between the two countries in order to solve 
in an amicable atmosphere all the outstanding problems not only in Europe but 
all over the world29. The Paris Government maintained that the advantages of 
such a co-operation would be fourfold: (a) in the first place, France would be able 
to reduce her land armaments very greatly, and to advance towards the military 
disarmament for which the British had pleaded, (b) France would be reconciled 
to the immediate admission of Germany to the Teague of Nations, which would 
constitute an effective guarantee for a more pacific policy on her part in the 
future, (c) such an alliance would have a most stabilising effect on the Continent, 
and notably on Germany herself, who would think seriously before incurring the 
terrible risk of a revival of a war, and (d) it would enable France to join Great 
Britain and Germany in an attempt to reconstruct the shattered fabric of the 
Russian State30.
Nonetheless, the British, although admitting that the benefit of the suggested 
alliance with Europe was beyond question, were very sceptical about it. They 
never stopped taking into consideration the fact that the French, since the end of 
the war, had been actively pursuing a policy which was either unfriendly to British 
interests or, if not that, was bent on the promotion of French interests which were 
inconsistent with theirs. Moreover, they did not want to arouse any suspicion about 
revival of the old policy of State alliances -as it would be regarded in many 
quarters- with the objective of dominating and controlling the future of Europe.
29. As the French Ambassador, Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire -and the French Press as well- 
suggested the British Government that the proposed alliance would rest on the principle that, while 
Great Britain would support French policy in Europe, and especially on German problem, France 
would support British policy throughout the rest of the world, and especially in the Middle East. 
F.0.371/6470, E 6462/1/44, Curzon to Hardinge, 13 July 1921 ; The British Ambassador informed 
Curzon, on 17th December 1921, that “Berthelot (Director General of the French Foreign 
Ministry) was quite open about it. He said that if we would support the French more on the Rhine, 
France would help us a great deal more in the East, recognising that the Rhine is the frontier of 
France and that the East is our frontier”. C. Lowe - M. L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power, vol. II: 
British Foreign Policy, 1914-1922, London, 1972, p. 367; The same, essentially, was proposed by 
Sir E. Crowe in a memorandum 6 months ago: “If we want France to stand by us and support our 
policy in the East, I am afraid we must bargain and pay [...] I believe France would pay a high price 
for an alliance by which we gave security against a German attack on the Rhine”. D. Dakin, “Lord 
Curzon’s policy towards Greece ( 1920-1923)”, Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas, Thessaloniki 
1975, p. 542.
30. F.O. 371/7000, W 12716/12716/17, Curzon to Hardinge, 5 December 1921.
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Apart from the above-mentioned, however, the British did not lose sight of the fact 
that they should be careful not to do anything that would lead Italy to think that she 
had been ostracised, or isolated, or turned out of an alliance which immensely 
flattered her national pride. The major problem, nevertheless, was the British 
themselves. What would the opinion of the British parliament, the British press, 
and the British public of such an entanglement be, and what would its effect on 
British policy throughout the world be? As Lord Curzon wrote in a memorandum, 
on 28 December 1921 :
[...] A proposal by his Majesty’s Government to commit this country to go to war 
again -not for a narrowly defined and easily intelligible object, such as the 
defence of the eastern frontier of France, which is also the external frontier of 
Britain- but for objects which will be difficult to define in words, and in 
contingencies which, though unlikely to arise, cannot be described as impossible, 
will, I think, excite in many quarters the gravest disappointment and alarm [...] 
There is a feeling of profound mistrust, if not worse, at the acceptance of fresh 
warlike commitments; this will be enhanced by the fear that a treaty of alliance 
with France may drag us into a war in which direct British interests are not 
involved31, and which might have been avoided had not our ally encouraged to 
take up an unbending attitude, in regard to the particular matter, which constitutes 
the immediate casus belli by the knowledge that, in the event of rupture, British 
armed assistance was assured32 [...].
This being the case, the British Government adopted Curzon’s view -who 
thought it would be unwise to abandon the very powerful form of pressure, which 
the tactic of non-conclusion of the pact enabled them to exercise33- and through 
the Foreign Office announced their decision that:
31. The French suggested that the proposed alliance would have to be in a double form, 
or to provide two stages, the one dealing with direct attack; the other with indirect attack. There 
was not any problem with the provision of “direct” attack, since -as it was natural- if the frontiers 
of France were crossed, the British nation would be at war with the aggressor. The problem had to 
do with the provision of “indirect” attack. Such a case might arise if a resuscitated Germany, in 
combination with a resuscitated Russia, decided to fall upon Poland. In such a case Britain would 
be obliged to take part in the conflict, although her interests were different and more remote, since 
the French would consider it equivalent to a direct attack upon their country, ibid.
32. F.0.371 /7000, W 13355/G, Curzon's memo on the Anglo-French alliance, 28 December 1921.
33. F.O. 371/8251, W 3150/50/17, Curzon’s memo on the Anglo-French Pact, 17 February 
1922.
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Before the conclusion of any form of pact with France, all outstanding difficulties 
between the two Governments should be discussed and satisfactorily settled34.
This decision on the part of the British35 caused much resentment across the 
Channel; the French press reacted bitterly after the announcement of non­
conclusion of the pact, regarding this action as the possible withdrawal of Great 
Britain from her present alliance entailing her subsequent conclusion of 
agreements with other Powers36.
So, the failure of the French efforts to access Great Britain’s co-operation in 
the settlement of the German problem giving her a free hand in the Middle East, 
and her dependence upon the British-American disposition for assistance, 
offended the French who discovered with frustration that although they had won 
the war they had lost the peace. This failure, attributed to the short-sighted policy 
of Great Britain, resulted in an “undeclared” war against her, the theatre of which 
was, this time, the possessions of the former Ottoman Empire.
It had become obvious in the course of the Peace Conference that the corner­
stone of the eastern settlement, the Syrian question, was connected with the 
problem of the security of France as regards Germany, the extension of the 
latter’s eastern boundaries included. France not being prepared to deal with the 
Arab problem, the promptness and the efficiency of British policy towards it, and 
additionally the overwhelming British military predominance over the Levant 
after the end of the war, created the preconditions of a conflict of the interests of 
the two western democracies. According to the agreements concluded during the 
war (Sykes-Picot, on May 1916 and Saint Jean de Maurienne, on April 1917), 
Syria, Cilicia and Lebanon were assigned to France, while the southern part of 
Mesopotamia, Baghdad included, to Great Britain; it had, additionally, been 
agreed that Palestine should be under international control. As these agreements, 
were the result of secret diplomacy without all the interested parties taking part 
in their formulation, it was impossible to put them into effect, without high level
34. F.O. 371/8251, W 3150/50/17,4 April 1922.
35. There was, nevertheless, an opposite view besides the official one. That which considered 
the latter the same as “to put the cart before the horse”, since no progress would be possible on that 
method, whereas, if the central question would be settled (i.e. the desirable security against 
Germany), all the other questions would be found easier at the periphery, or at least no worse. F.O. 
371/7567, C 6200/6200/18, Waterlow’s minute, 28 April 1922.
36. F.O. 371/8251, W 3900/50/17, Hardinge to Foreign Office, 8 May 1922.
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of co-operation between the Powers most interested in that area, namely Britain 
and France. Notwithstanding this precondition -the sine qua non one of any 
success of the plans for domination or tutelage over the Near and Middle East- 
the two western powers fought each other over the division of the spoils; as 
Colonel Lawrence said about the main agreement between Britain and France, 
i.e. that of Sykes-Picot:
Each party making the terms considered only what it could take, or rather 
what could be most difficult for her neighbours to take or refuse; the 
document is not the constitution of a new Asia, but a confession, almost 
an advertisement, of the greed of the conquerors. No single clause of it 
will stand the test of three years’ practice37.
The belief, nevertheless, that Russia would not be in any immediate position 
to exert any influence upon the Turkish settlement, and the refusal of the United 
States to assume responsibilities in the Near East, made France and Britain feel 
it safer to quarrel with each other rather than immediately to divide up amicably 
the spoils of the defeated enemy.
This being the case, the presence of huge British armies in the Levant 
unilaterally changed the Sykes-Picot agreement to the advantage of Great 
Britain38: Palestine and Mosul came under British control since, after Russia’s 
withdrawal, it was no longer necessary to support the idea of internationalization 
in Palestine; besides, Russia’s threat from Armenia no longer necessitated the 
abandoning of Mosul to the French39. Moreover, after the war was over, the 
British decided to detach Syria from the French control -although that area was 
considered hereditarily French domain- for the General Staff pronounced, that:
[...] from the strategic point of view, we should aim at a politically detached Syria
37. H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post War Near East. The Decline of French 
Influence, London 1938, p. 29.
38. In Lloyd George’s view it was a settlement that “entirely overlooked the fact that our 
position in Turkey had been won by large British forces, whereas our allies had contributed but 
little to the result”. W. Stivers, op. cit., p. 25.
39. J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920, London 1969, p. 48; 
Since Russia was overwhelmed by revolution and had fallen out of the Great Power status, there 
was not reason any more for playing Mosul the role of a barrier in the path of Russian advance into 
the Middle East and Persian Gulf in particular. So, the deliberate British oversight regarding Mosul 
should be rectified. W. Stivers, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
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under our influence [...] Finally it is difficult to see how any arrangement could 
be more objectionable from the military point of view than the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, by which an enterprising and ambitious foreign power is placed on 
interior lines with reference to our position in the Middle East40.
The result of this decision was that the “Clapham Junction of the Imperial 
communications”, as Sir Henry Wilson (Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff) once characterized Syria’s vital significance to the British 
Empire, soon became a field of extreme tension between Britain and France. It 
would not be otherwise so long as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Stéphane J. M. Pichon, declared in the Chamber, on 29 December 1918, that 
France had historical rights in Syria, Lebanon, Cilicia and Palestine and, 
therefore, would not hesitate to enforce them41. The fact, however, that she had 
only fragmentary, though well qualified units in Arabia, a small detachment in 
Palestine, and a half-trained Syro-Armenian voluntary force in Cilicia42, whilst 
at the same time the Arabs regarded French predominance as wholly 
incompatible with the independence they had fought -or plotted- to gain, made 
the French position even more weak43. Furthermore, the French accused the 
British officials and officers of spreading propaganda all over the area assigned 
to France, with the purpose of opposing anything which might help to give the 
natives a right appreciation of France, or to cause her to be despised and hated 
by them, so long as she was alleged to be not only a minor Power, but the docile 
and selfeffacing subaltern of the British Empire44. On top of all this, the close
40. F.O. 371/4178, 13280/2117/44, Memorandum of the General Staff on the Strategic 
importance of Syria to the British Empire, 9 November 1918.
41. F.O. 371/4178, 2820/2117, no. 20, Wingate (Cairo) to Foreign Office, 5 January 1919.
42. An explanation for that weak military presence on the part of France in the Levant after 
the war was over, could be the fact that France, in the period from spring 1916 to autumn 1918, 
experienced four different cabinets, as well as that at the time of the most critical German offensive 
in the west front, from the end of March to the middle of July 1918 -when the very existence of 
France was at stake- could not be found but little interest in Paris for operations in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, at the final moment of the military effort and during the first phase of political 
persuasion in Syria and Palestine, her Government was led by Clemenceau who was by education, 
ideals and beliefs, much more inclined to occupy himself with national defence than colonial 
conquest. J. Nevakivi, op. cit., p. 65.
43. F.O. 371/4178, 7094/2117/44, Memorandum by D.G. Hogarth, 18 December 1918.
44. F.O. 371/4179,49120/2117/44, Note upon the British aims in Asia Minor, communicated 
to Balfour by Pichon, Paris, 6 February 1919.
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relations between the Emir Feisal, son of King of Hedjaz -who proclaimed on 
October 3,1918, an Arab Government in Syria- with the British, in conjunction 
with the disclosure that the latter made him a monthly allowance of £200.000, 
convinced the French that Feisal was a simple instrument of Britain; one more 
piece of evidence of the totally hostile action of the British towards them in the 
East45.
Facing the challenge of their position in the Levant because of the over­
whelming British military preponderance, the French continued to demand what 
had been assigned to them by the Sykes-Picot agreement, namely the unimpaired 
and total control over Syria and Mosul46. The former represented the whole moral 
edifice built up by them in the Levant from the time of the Crusades, 
consequently it was considered a matter of national pride47 not to make any 
concession in that region48. As regards the latter, it was not only the care of the 
Kurds -Mosul was their real capital- who were Christians and belonged 
ethnographically to the Indo-European race, which made the French think that it 
would be a great error on their part to allow them to be under Arab suzerainty, 
i.e. part of the Mesopotamian Kingdom under British control; the great wealth 
of petroleum deposits, many of which were quite near the surface, and other 
mining riches such as copper, antimony and even gold, were the main reasons 
for France defending her rights in that area49. That is why the latter raised the 
question of remaking a new agreement, in the case of Syria, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia, which would be more satisfactory to her than that of 191650.
The British, however, had no desire to alter the status quo formed after the
45. Ibid.·, see also H. Nicolson, Peacemaking, London 1933, pp. 139-141.
46. J. Mourelos, «*Η γαλλο-τουρκική προσέγγιση του 1921. To Σύμφωνο Franklin- 
Bouillon και ή έκκένωση τής Κιλικίας» [The Franco-Turkish Rapprochement. The Franklin- 
Bouillon Agreement and the Evacuation of Cilicia], Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών 
Σπονδών, vol. 4 (1983), pp. 214-215.
47. It was not, of course, the alleged wounded national pride, the only reason for insisting the 
French on their “titles” over Syria. French capital had played a large part in developing road and 
rail communications in Syria. Ports and municipal enterprises like gas and electricity had been 
supported. The silk industry established in Lebanon and other industrial developments were 
promoted by French businessmen. A. Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North 
Africa, 1914-1967, London 1968, p. 6.
48. F.O. 371/4178,4179,11590,54702/2117/44, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 16 January-6 April 
1919; F.O. 371/4178, 21612/2117/44, G. Grahame to Curzon, Paris, 6 February 1919.
49. F.O. 371/4179,47891/2117/44, G. Grahame to Curzon, Pans, 25 March 1919.
50. F.O. 371/4179,44731/2117/44, no. 540, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 20 March 1919.
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end of the war. So, one year after the deposition of Feisal and his total withdrawal 
from Syria51, the London Government, through W. Churchill (Secretary of State 
for the Colonies), announced, on 14th June 1921, their support to the candidature 
of the Emirs Feisal and Abdullah as rulers over Mesopotamia and Transjordania, 
respectively. This produced much bitter comment in France, who remained 
determined in her opposition to Feisal’s election, in spite of assurances given by 
His Majesty’s Government that no support would be given to him in any 
enterprise that he might contemplate against Syria52.
This being the case, it was not considered unnatural for the French to wage a 
severe anti-British propaganda war in the Levant with the purpose of undermin­
ing53 the British position in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Egypt54 55.
The causes of friction, nevertheless, between Britain and France were not only 
confined to Europe and the Levant, but also extended to Africa and especially to 
Tangier. This city, being located at the entrance of the Mediterranean, was of high 
strategic and commercial importance to Britain, and for that reason she insisted 
on its internationalisation, as long as it was accepted that:
[If Tangier was controlled by a hostile Power] [...] the British position in the 
Mediterranean would be very seriously menaced, and the effect would extend to 
our Indian and Eastern possessions. The value of Gibraltar to Great Britain, 
which largely depends on the denial of that fortress to a possible enemy, would 
tend to disappear altogether [Thus] [...] our advantage lies in maintaining Tangier 
as an undefended port unsuitable for naval use. This can be best secured by 
Tangier remaining under international control of France, Spain and Great 
Britain” [...].
The French, however, did not accept the aforesaid British claim, maintaining
51. F.O. 371/6998, W 8800/8800/17, Hardinge to Curzon, Annual Report on France, 1920, 
paras. 211-223.
52. F.O. 371/6344, E 7125/7125/65, Hardinge to Curzon, Paris, 19June 1921 \ Annual Report 
on France, 1921, op. cit., paras. 40-42.
53. The new cabinet which was formed after Clemenceau’s resignation, adopted a different 
policy-line; rather than to secure France’s Middle East interests proclaimed herself advocate of 
Turkey’s integrity. J. Mourelos, op. cit., p. 216.
54. F.O. 371/6458, E 1815 - E 12929/121/89, Major Ormby-Gore (M.P.) to Harmsworth 
(Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) - Hardinge to Bonnevay (Acting Prime Minister 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs), 8 February - 23 November 1921.
55. F.O. 371/8343, W 2207/197/28, Memo by G. H. Villiers on Tangier, 10 March 1922.
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that, although they had agreed, in 1914, on the terms of the “Statut spécial de 
Tanger”, they did so only because they were tied up by the Act of Algeciras (7 
April 1906), by the Franco-German Convention of 1911, and fear of Germany. 
So, they contended that, since the Treaty of Versailles swept away the above- 
mentioned accords and all German obligations, the French Government was 
bound to carry out the terms of the various treaties and conventions, which never 
referred specifically to internationalisation, but only to a “régime” or “caractère 
spécial”. This contention caused a strong reaction on the part of the British, who 
protested that:
[...] The obligation to agree to internationalisation rested on definite French 
engagements to His Majesty’s Government which the French could not 
honourably evade, and in return for which they had received their quid pro quo, 
i.e. our adherence to the Franco-German Convention of 1911 and our recognition 
of the French protectorate56.
It had already been more than obvious that the Tangier question, presenting 
“certain difficulties”, as Poincaré said, would serve, for many years to come, to 
incite friction between Britain and France57.
This being the case58, the presence of the Greek army in Asia Minor was faced 
with hostility, so long as it was thought to be acting as an instrument59 or worse 
as a “cat’s-paw”60 of the British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
56. Ibid.
57. F.O. 371/8244, W 528/50/17, Minute by Villiers, 17 January 1922.
58. It is characteristic that Clemenceau, a lifelong exponent of co-operation with Britain, 
remarked privately: “England is the lost illusion of my life! Not a day passes that I do not receive 
from one of our agents abroad reports indicating veritably hostile acts. I had hoped that the 
fraternity of arms [...] would suppress the old traditional prejudices. Not at all. The evil is without 
remedy”. G. Wright, France in Modern Times, 1760 to the present, London 1962, pp. 437-438.
59. F.O. 371/7869, E 646/5/44, Cheetham to Foreign Office, Paris, 1 August 1922; Besides, 
Poincaré (French Prime Minister) stated to an American publicist, in late July 1922, that: “[...] France 
do not oppose Greece by reason of Greece herself, but because Greece is acting as an agent of Great 
Britain in the Levant and moreover that France could not bear British prevalence at Constantinople 
[...]”. A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/Vl()), 2533, Ragavis to Foreign Ministry, London, 2 August 1922; 
Revealing, to this effect, could be considered the report which was submitted to a foreign High 
Commissioner, under the title “La politique française en Turquie”. A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/VI(i)),4129, 
Triantafyllakos(High Commissioner) to Foreign Ministry, Constantinople, 13 August 1922.
60. F.O. 371/7585, C 12094/13/19, Bentinck to Curzon, Athens, 8 August 1922.
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Its expulsion, therefore, not only out of Smyrna but from Eastern Thrace as 
well, was considered imperative, since it would be detrimental to British 
interests in the area. For that reason, the Paris Government had been very helpful 
to Kemal offering him not only diplomatic support61 but also saving him from 
one more front, after the retirement of the French troops from Cilicia, as a result 
of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement on 20 October 192162. The French support 
of the Nationalists63, however, did not stop at that point; it was a common secret 
that France was providing the Nationalists with guns64, going so far as to hand 
over munitions to them from the Turkish stores at Constantinople, which were 
under their guard65.
So, after the collapse of the Greek front and the appearance of the Turkish 
army at Chanak, Poincaré, attempting, on the one hand to increase the prestige 
and negotiating position of France towards Kemalist Turkey66, as well as to
61. F.O. 371/7856, E 2065/5/44, Rumbold to Foreign Office, Constantinople, 21 February 
1922.
62. S. R. Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923. Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National 
Movement, London 1975, p. 138; For a detailed account about Franklin-Bouillon agreement, 
J. Mourelos, op. cit., pp. 227-243.
63. Twice, nevertheless, there was reverse of French opinion against the Turks and in favour 
of Greece. The first time, because of the conditions imposed by the Nationalists on the French in 
order to ratify the Franco-Turkish treaty concluded in March 1921, and because of rejection of the 
French proposals concerning Cilicia followed by Turkish advance towards Aleppo. The second 
time, when was realised by the French that Kemal’s army was not all powerful as they had 
believed. F.O. 371/6470, E 6157/1/44, Hardinge to Curzon, Paris, 28 May 1921; F.O. 371/7867, 
E 6440/5/44, Malcolm to Harmsworth (without place), 28 June 1922.
64. F.O. 371/6475, E 10966/1/44, Rumbold to Curzon, Constantinople, 28 September 1921; 
A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/V1 , 285 - F. E. 2/785 - 8685/11/23638 - 728, Triantafyllakos- Dousmanis 
(Rear Admiral) to Foreign Ministry - Chatzianestis (Field Marshal) to War Ministry - Kolovos 
(second secretary of the Vice-Consulate in Pyrgos) to Foreign Ministry, 29 April-4 May - 10-18 
August 1922; H. R. Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne” in Diplomats, 1919- 
1939, ed. by A. G. Craig - F. Gilbert, vol. 1, New Jersey, 1953, p. 193; D. Dakin, op. cit., p. 542; 
The French, leaving Cilicia, handed over all their arms and munitions to the Nationalists. 
J. Mourelos, op. cit., pp. 257-262.
65. F.O. 371/7858, E 3282/5/44, Harington to the Secretary of War, Constantinople, 10 March 
1922; D.B.F.P., XVII, no 746; As Rumbold reported, it was not strange that it could be kept 
nothing secret from the Turks, so long as Pellé (The French High Commissioner at Constantinople) 
diclosed to the Nationalists whatever was being discussed in High Commissioners’ meetings and 
he delivered them whatever memoranda were being exchanged amongst their Governments. F.O. 
371/7871, E 8425/5/44, Rumbold to Oliphant, 15 August 1922.
66. France had great financial interests in Turkey than any other country: French bondholders,
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Muslim World67 and, on the other hand, to undermine British policy in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, he totally identified himself with Kemal’s demands for 
the immediate handing over of Eastern Thrace to the Turks. As the French Prime 
Minister explained to Curzon on September 20, the information that a revolution 
was imminent in Eastern Thrace68, if the Allies did not satisfy that demand, 
influenced his decision not to expose the French troops to the danger of fighting 
against the Nationalists. Moreover, he did not conceal his anxiety about the 
safety of the French colony in Constantinople which would undergo Turkish 
savagery, unless all the desired concessions were met69.
according to Berthelot, held 80% of the Ottoman debt of£144 million and there was a good deal of 
French money invested in various enterprises in Turkey. Since the French investors had lost all the 
immense sums they had lent to Czarist Russia, Millerand and Poincaré administrations -more 
susceptible to the pressures by the powerful financial circles- wanted to secure at all costs, at least, 
the repayment of the Ottoman debt. D. Lloyd George, op. cit., p. 1273; J. Mourelos, op. cit., p. 212; 
Besides, good relations with Turkey would be most conducive to French interests. The Turkish 
Government, which had marched from Ankara to Constantinople with the goodwill of France, 
would have much to give. W. S. Churchill, op. cit.. p. 411; It should be pointed out, however, that 
one more reason for the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor was the fact that, being the Greek 
middle class the dominating element in Turkey, it would constitute tough and dangerous rival to 
economic and commercial interests of France. Therefore, the target could not be other than its 
elimination, so that the Western Capital to enter direct business with Nationalist Turkey - policy 
which has been followed ever since. S. Maximos, Κοινοβούλιο ή δικτατορία [Parliamentarism or 
Dictatorship], Athens 19752, p. 25.
67. As regards the relations between Paris and Muslim world, Poincaré -trying to justify the 
French consent to all Turkish demands- stated in a speech addressed at Vau Coulcrs, on 8 October, 
that France was a great Power with large Muslim populations, whose attitute and susceptibilities 
could not but influence the Eastern policy of France. Besides, if Eastern Thrace had been refused 
to the Turks, it would be possible the hostilities to be prolonged and moreover a general islamic 
rising to be provoked. F.0.371/7900, E 10716/27/44, Hardinge to Foreign Office, Paris, 8 October 
1922.
68. France would not have to be afraid of any rising, if she had not created herself the 
preconditions for its outbreak: By mid summer 1922, the French distributed guns and grenades to 
the Muslim populations behind Chatalja line. On September 1922, it has been known that the 
French military mission at Sofia was encouraging Bulgaria to take advantage of the situation and 
make troubles for Greece in Thrace, calling moreover on Turks of Macedonia to join Bulgarian in 
shaking off Greek yoke and forming autonomous Macedonia in conjuction with Kemal. A.Y.E. 
1922, A/5/VI , Π. 471, X. Simopoulos (Acting High Commissioner) to Foreign Ministry, 
Constantinople, 25 July 1922; F.O. 371/7888, E 9319/27/44, Bcntinck to Foreign Office, Athens, 
13 September 1922.
69. D.B.F.P., XV11I, nos. 42,51.
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Great Britain, therefore, found herself in a very awkward position. If her 
Allies did not join forces with her, she would have to face and stop the Natio­
nalists alone. Did she, however, have the strength to take such a dangerous and 
audacious action? The resolution of 15th August 1919 -known as “Ten Years 
Rule”- which stipulated that the British Empire would not be engaged in any 
great war during the next ten years, weakened her military power considerably70. 
For the first time, after many generations, the balance between her military 
power and the magnitude of her commitments was disturbed71. As the naval 
policy was set in the direction of reduction and retrenchment72, the inability to 
adopt a power policy -which unavoidably would lead to war- was consequent.
Furthermore, the refusal of India and Dominions -with the sole exception of 
New Zealand, which offered a battalion73- to send troops to reinforce the British 
positions at the Straits, increased the problem and made it clear that Britain was 
not militarily prepared to meet the Kemalist threat in the Dardanelles and in Iraq 
simultaneously. (The possibility of Kemalist attack against Iraq will be 
examined below.) The British Government, however, was confronted with 
serious difficulties in another quarter as well; the situation in Egypt, because of 
the development of the Nationalist movement, was far from good and as Murray 
wrote on 9 October 1922, an Anglo-Turkish conflict would possibly endanger 
the British position in Egypt:
[...] In view of possibility that his Majesty’s Government may suddenly find 
themselves engaged in military and naval operations against the Turks, I venture 
to submit that the effect of such a conflict on our position in Egypt should be 
considered [because] [...] the occurrence of such a crisis, which would be hailed
70. B. Bond, British Military Policy between the two World Wars, Oxford 1980, pp. 23-27.
71. Sir Henry Wilson was very worried about the gap between British power and British 
responsibilities. As he wrote to Admiral Cowan, in April 1919 (in C. E. Callwell, Field Marshal 
Sir Henry Wilson. His Life and Letters, vol. II, London 1927, p. 182): “My whole energies are now 
bent to getting our troops out of Europe and Russia and concentrating all our strength in our coming 
storm centres, viz. England, Ireland, Egypt and India”. D. R. Watson, “The Making of the Treaty 
of Versailles”, Troubled Neighbours, ed. by Neville Waites. London 1971, p. 76; B. Bond, op. cit.,
p. 10.
72. It is characteristic that in winter of 1922 the number of the forces of the Royal Navy had 
been reduced to such a level that for first time it was made impossible for Christmas leave to be 
granted. P. Pipinelis, Ιστορία τής εξωτερικής πολιτικής τής Έλλάόος, 1923-1941 [History of 
Greek Foreign Policy, 1923-1941], Athens 1948, p. 119.
73. B. C. Busch, op. cit., p. 348.
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as a British disaster, would of itself create a dangerous atmosphere in this country 
[...] If, moreover, the crisis [at the Straits] is a grave one, it might be necessary 
temporarily to deplete the garrison [...] it would therefore be necessary to decide 
whether to run the risk of leaving a weak garrison of one or two battalions in 
Cairo, where they would be cut off by anything in the nature of a general rising; 
or to withdraw British troops to the canal zone and Alexandria, where isolation 
would be impossible. The adoption of the second alternative would be the least 
risky course, but it would involve imposing on the Egyptian Government the 
entire responsibility for maintaining order in the interior of the country, and if 
they proved successful, they would be in a position to argue with much force that 
the presence of British troops outside Alexandria and the canal zone had been 
shown to be unnecessary74.
Besides the military deadlock, however, the British Government also 
experienced stiff pressure from the public opinion, which was definitely opposed 
to war. The average Briton was not prepared to fire another shot for any cause75. 
In addition, after the Greek defeat, there was a resurgence in the Conservative 
breast of the old admiration for the Turks and their masterful ways with the 
subject races; nevertheless, the fact that the majority of the Cabinet and the 
General Staff was pro-Turk, rendered very difficult the prolonging of Lloyd 
George’s anti-Turkish policy76.
On the other hand, the British Empire -being the greatest Muslim power in 
the world- could not ignore or even offend the religious feelings of more than 
70 million Muslims in India. Besides, the pressure exerted by the Indian Muslims 
and the wish on the part of the British not to provoke their religious feelings and 
finally not to endanger their position in India77 as well as in the Islamic world, 
was the other most important factor which forced the London Government to 
agree to the Nationalists’ demands.
74. F.O. 371/7900, E 10681/27/44, Minute by Murray, 9 October 1922.
75. D. Lloyd George, op. cit., p. 1350; B. Bond, op. cit., p. 35; A. Toynbee, The Western 
Question in Greece and Turkey, New York 19702, p. 59.
76. A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/Vl(r), 3136, Ragavis to Foreign Ministry, London, 24 September 1922; 
D. Lloyd George, op. cit., p. 1350; W. S. Churchill, op. cit., p. 391.
77. Great Britain’s economic interests at stake were so great that Muhammad Ali (one of 
Khilafat’s movement leader) said in a speech in Madras, on April 2,1921 : “[...] A shot Fired from 
Madras kills [the British textile industry in] Manchester”. G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement. 
Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, New York 1982, p. 133.
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Since the end of the war the Indian Muslims had continued to plead, pass 
resolutions, and put pressure -especially through the “Khilafat Movement”- on 
the Metropolitan Government that it should not antagonise the Muslims, nor 
deprive Turkey of Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, and leave intact the temporal 
and the spiritual power of the Caliph in Constantinople78, otherwise they would 
support their Caliph against his enemies, severing all relations of loyalty with 
Great Britain, while any unfavourable arrangement regarding the Turkish 
territory and the position of the Caliph would be considered as an aggressive act 
against Islam itself79.
This being the case, the Viceroy informed the Government that -apart from 
the resolutions and speeches which were mainly an hysterical outburst of a 
highly emotional people- the most alarming fact was the open expression of 
disloyalty, although conditional, which might lead to local disorder. At the end 
of 1920, constant deterioration of the political situation in India made him urge 
that the Sultan’s suzerainty, at least over the holy places (e.g. Hedjaz), should be 
recognised80.
It did not escape the attention of the British, however, that the Khilafat 
movement covered the real scope of the Indian Muslims, in combination with 
Hindus, which was the final liberation of India81. On the other hand, the Indian 
Muslims, standing with the Kemalist movement, continued to accuse the British 
of helping the Greeks in their offensive against the Turks, whilst they spread the
78. F.O. 371/5140, E 490/139/44, Abdul-Bari to Curzon, Lucknow, 30 January 1920; F.O. 
371/5140, E 139 - 477/139/44, Anglo-Ottoman Society to Curzon - H. R. Syed Abdul Majid 
(Islamic Society, London), to Foreign Office, 18-22 February 1920; F.O. 371/5140, E 
1102/139/44, Abulkalam Azad (President of Bengal Khilafat Conference) to Curzon, Calcutta, 1 
March 1920; B. C. Busch, op. cit., p. 330.
79. F.O. 371/5140, E 1128/139/44, A. C. Wratislaw (Consul-General) to Curzon, Beirut, 18 
February 1920; F.O. 371/5141, E 3782/139/44, Islamic Society's resolution, 25 April 1920; F.O. 
371/5142, E 8907/139/44, Council of all India Muslim League to Prime Minister, Lucknow, 
received 27 July 1920.
80. F.O. 371/5140, E 2031/139/44, Viceroy to India Office, 7 March 1920; F.O. 371/5142, 
El4951/139/44, Viceroy to India Office, 23 November 1920.
81. F.O. 371/6549, E 1013/347/44, Shuckburgh (India Office) to Oliphant (Foreign Office), 
Memo by Major Bray (Political Intelligence officer attached to India Office) under the litle “The 
Indian Khilafat Delegation", 18 January 1921; G. Minault, op. cit., p. 110; Munir Ahmad Baluch, 
7/ ελληνική εκστρατεία στη Μ. ’Ασία καί ι) στάση των Ινδών Μουσουλμάνων, 1918-1922 
[The Greek Expedition in Asia Minor and the Role of Indian Muslims, 1918-1922], Ph. D., 
Thessaloniki 1987, pp. 83-85,93.
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rumour that only Britain, unlike France and Italy, was opposed to the 
modification of the Peace Treaty82 -that is the restoration of Smyrna and Thrace 
to the Turks- thus increasing the humiliation of the Caliph and Islam as well.
Although the employment of counter-propaganda on the part of His 
Majesty’s Government towards the Caliphate was proposed83, soon it was 
understood that, under those circumstances, it would be beside the point; for the 
pro-Turk agitation did not derive from the Indian Muslims’ liking for the Turks 
-they were no more enamoured of them than the Egyptians or the Syrians- but 
from the concept they held about the nature of Islam and the mission of the 
Caliph in Constantinople: the Muslims believed that the Head of the Faith must 
be free and independent. The Arab King of the Hedjaz was not considered by 
them free and independent, nor was the Emir Feisal (both were under British 
tutelage), nor was Mulay Youssef, Sultan of Morocco (under the French 
protectorate). For that reason they looked to Turkey as the Power that had for 
years been the bulwark of Islam in dealing with the Western Powers and they 
were convinced, on grounds of emotion rather than of reason, that Islam could 
not permit Turkey to be relegated to the position of a third rate power, so long as 
she was the only country that could give them the free independent Caliph 
required by their faith84. Moreover the Indian Muslims’ attitude towards Turkey 
was strongly connected to their position in India, as well as their relations with 
Hindus. On that; Howell was very clear, writing that:
[...] The attitude of Muslims in India vis-à-vis Hindus had always been one of 
pride and superiority in their many differences. They had lost no opportunity of 
impressing on Hindus that whatever might be the local and numerical 
importance of Hindus in India, their position could not compare with that of 
Muslims. For Islam was a World Power; their Caliph was the secular ruler not 
only of a kingdom of Asiatic importance, but of considerable influence and 
prestige in Europe85 [...].
82. F.O. 371/5141, E 3430/139/44, Islamic Society’s resolution, 15 April 1920; F.O. 
371/6549, E 991/347/44, P. 424, Viceroy to India Office, 18 January 1921; F.O. 371/6508, E 
4170/143/44, P. 1785, Viceroy to India Office, 5 April 1921.
83. F.O. 371/7858, E 3405/5/44, Memorandum by Mr. Ryan suggesting lines of a counter­
propaganda against the "Caliphate " and similar agitations, 26 March 1922.
84. F.O. 371/8351, W 1826/1375/28, A. Robertson to Curzon, Tangier, 14 February 1922; 
F.O. 371/7867, E 6937/5/44, E. B. Howell (for Secretary to the Government to India) to India 
Office, Simla, 25 April 1922.
85. F.O. 371/7867, E 6937/5/44, op. cit.
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To this effect, Turkey’s reduction to insignificance would be considered a 
fatal blow to the prestige, influence and strength of Islam as a whole86.
This being the case, the Viceroy, on 26th January 1921, expressed himself 
openly in favour of the Treaty’s revision for preserving tranquillity in India87. By 
June of the same year he warned that constant support to the Greeks might cause 
embarrassing and dangerous agitation in the country, whilst in October he 
suggested the immediate return of Eastern Thrace to the Turks, as the only means 
of restoring British influence in the Muslim world88. After one year, on 11 
September 1922, the Viceroy submitted a colourful account of the conditions in 
India, causing serious doubts about the continuation of the peace and unity of the 
Empire:
A Graeco-Turkish crisis must be expected to cause violent repercussion through 
the Islamic world, and may add considerably to our difficulties in India, on the 
North-West frontier and Afghanistan. We, therefore, earnestly beg that His 
Majesty’s Government will give every possible weight to India’s interest before
86. In spite, however, the widespread concept among the Indian Muslims that the Ottoman 
Sultan was the Calipha, viz. the leader of all the Muslims, the Arabs themselves rebutted such an 
idea describing it as flatly contrary to History. So, they maintained that the Mohammedans of 
Hedjaz and of Morocco looked to their own Sherrifs as their spiritual heads; the Shias believed the 
Khilafat to belong to the twelfth Imam, and the Wahabis of Centra! Arabia did not recognised the 
Ottoman Sultan as Calipha..According to Professor Jadunath Sarkar, who was an eminent 
authority on the Mongul period, the most orthodox of the Mongul Emperors did not acknoweledge 
the spiritual headship of the Sultans of Turkey, the Koranic concept being that the Muslim mler of 
a Mohammedan kingdom was himself the only person whom his subjects could regard as Caliph. 
In his correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey, Aurungzed, never hailed the latter as “Calipha”, 
but as “Caesar of Rome”. The fact that this Caesar of Rome was in possession of the Holy Places 
of Islam, was apparently irrelevant to any claim on his part to universal Khilafat. Similarly, Shah 
Jedan never acknowledged the Sultan of his day as Caliph or Viceregent of God. Professor Sarkar 
summed up the position as follows: “In short, the theory that the Muslim ruler of Turkey is the 
spiritual Head of all the Mohammedans, wherever they may live, is a creation of the late nineteenth 
century, and merely a result of the growth of a political pan-islamic movement as a natural reaction 
against steady absorption of all Sovereign Islamic States by the Christians”. F.O. 371/5141, E 
3090/139/44, H. McPherson (Secretary to the Government of India) to the local Government 
(without place), 10 February 1920.
87. F.O. 371/6549, E 1441/347/44, Viceroy to India Office, 26 January 1921.
88. Cabinet Papers (=Cab.) 24/125, C.P. 3092, 23 June 1921; Cab. 24/129, C.P. 3412, 11 
October 1921.
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reaching their decision [...] From India’s standpoint, the essential thing is the 
restoration of the old cordial relations between Great Britain and Turkey [...] 
Even if it [the concurrence to the Turkish demands] should involve re-adjustment 
in our general Arabian policy, this would be compensated for by increased 
stability, the cutting down of our own commitments and eventual restoration of 
our general prestige and influence throughout the East. On the other hand, any 
attempt to rob the Turks of the legitimate fruits of their victory would awaken a 
storm much greater than before throughout Islam, and might probably involve 
serious consequences to India89.
Despite the gloomy prediction, however, it was generally admitted -a view 
which Curzon himself adopted- that the pan-Islamic movement which favoured 
Kemal, was artificial90; nevertheless, despite opposition from the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Secretary, the British Government could ignore neither the grave 
situation in India91 nor the negative consequences of the appearance of a Muslim 
movement, regarding the preserve of the Empire’s predominant role over the 
Near and Middle East92.
In fact, the decisive zeal of Indian Muslims in favour of the Turks, in 
combination with the persistence of Kemalists in identifying Britain with the 
presence of the Greeks in Asia Minor, put the London Government in an 
untenable position, not only in India itself but in Mesopotamia as well (i.e. Iraq), 
where her position had not yet been secured, since a general Muslim rising could 
jeopardise her interests in the area. Besides, the India Office had noted earlier 
that there were important commercial and strategic interests in the Middle East
89. Cab. 24/138, C.P. 4186, II September 1922.
90. F.O. 371/7864, E 5139/5/44, Letter which was given to Harold Buxton (English 
Correspondent), who, in his turn, sent it to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Constantinople, 1 May 1922; H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925: A Study in Post- 
War Diplomacy, London 1939, p. 99; B. C. Busch, op. cit., p. 328; Munir Ahmad Baluch, op. cit., 
p. 40.
91. It was characteristic of the highly strained situation in that country that, after the collapse 
of Greek front in Asia Minor, the military authorities of India recommended the Government in 
London that, as the existence of British material among the captures from Greeks could be used 
by the Turks as a proof of British assistance to the Greeks, it was advisable that Reuters should be 
prevented from wiring such a report to India. F.O. 371/7889, E 9495/27/44, Chief of Staff (India) 
to War Office, 14 September 1922.
92. F.O. 371/8084, N 8433/8433/97, Abdul Hadi (Afghanistan’s Minister in London) to 
Curzon, 11 September 1922.
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for India and declared that a barricade should be set up in Mesopotamia which 
would effectually protect the landline of the Gulf from any potential enemy of 
the British Empire93.
In September 1922, however, it was not a matter of a potential enemy but of a 
victorious nationalist movement, which aimed to regain its most historical 
territories, including Mosul94. By September 1921, Churchill (Secretary of State 
for the Colonies) had referred to the possibility of Kemal’s attacking this area, in 
case the operations in Western Asia Minor came to a state of stalemate; in that 
event, he estimated that, repelling the enemy would cost at least 5 or 6 million 
pounds, whilst, at worst, they would be compelled to give up the Mosul Vilayet 
altogether95. His estimates, indeed, were correct; on 18th September 1922, King 
Feisal of Iraq informed the British High Commissioner that he was afraid that 
Kemal would immediately move against Iraq, if the Dardanelles question led to a 
state of war between Great Britain and Turkey96. This information could not have 
been more alarming; the Secretary of the State for War, L.W. Evans, in November 
1921, in a memorandum to the Cabinet had admitted that the preservation of the 
British presence in Iraq and Palestine depended upon peace in Mosul97; were the 
Turks to be in possession of Kurdistan and Mosul Vilayet, the small British 
garrison at Baghdad would be in a most exposed position thus rendering its forced 
withdrawal from this city -with the Turks better placed to stir up rebellion in Iraq- 
a most difficult and dangerous operation98.
Apart from the necessity of securing the Empire’s positions in Iraq and 
generally in the Middle East, London never wished to be involved in a battle with
93. F.O. 371/3756, 173183, D. 238, Indian Office memorandum under the title “Indian 
Desiderata for Peace Settlement", 4 December 1918; K. Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis 
of Empire, 1918-1922, Manchester 1984, p. 37.
94. The British had been informed on good authority that it was not only the French but the 
Americans as well who regarded not unfavourably a Turkish attempt at the reconquest of Mosul 
and the whole of Iraq. Regarding the French, the profits of such a policy would be not only 
economic (priority rights in the oil of Mosul and the concession for the Baghdad railway) but 
political as well. If the Turks returned to Iraq the French administration in Syria might appear 
relatively liberal and pro-Arab, and, moreover, the French would be rid of Feisal whom they 
regarded hankering after a throne in Damascus. F.O. 371/6347, E 14134/43/93, C.P. 3566, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Cabinet, 13 December 1921.
95. Cab. 24/128, C.P. 3328, 26 September 1921.
96. Cab. 24/138, C.P. 4198, 18 September 1922.
97. Cab. 24/129, C.P. 3474, 9 November 1921.
98. War Office (=W.O.) 33/1016, A 2495, 19 October 1922.
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the Turks for one other reason: oil, which was the main reason for the violation 
of Sykes-Picot agreement on the part of Great Britain. Although the Iraqi oil was 
not brought into production until 1927, it was natural for Iraq and especially 
Mosul to occupy a major place in British diplomatic and military concerns in the 
Middle East, since the Admiralty discovered, in August 1918, that it would need 
the entire oil production of that region after the war". Given the above- 
mentioned, the view that the stable condition on the Northern frontiers of Iraq as 
well as the British presence in the area would be secured99 100, only if favourable 
peace terms were offered to Kemal, did not constitute favourable preconditions 
for the solution of Eastern Thrace’s problem as far as Greek expectations were 
concerned.
The fact that Soviet Russia offered generous assistance to the Nationalists101 
did not weigh less in Great Britain’s decision to yield to the Turks102. The first 
communist country -in her endeavour to consolidate her position and to promote 
friendly relations with its neighbours, by helping to save them from imperial­
ism- approached Kemal and contributed so decisively to the realization of his 
national programme, that Turkey remained the keystone of Soviet policy in the
99. C. Lowe - M. L. Dockrill, op. cit., p. 357; M. Kent, Oil and Empire British Policy and 
Mesopotamian Oil, 1900-1920, London 1976, p. l4;Great Britain’s intention to secure her access 
to the Mesopotamian oil was pointed out by the reports of the special American mission at 
Lausanne: “[...] There is some reason to believe that the policy of Great Britain, backed by the 
general attitude of the Conservatives in England, might seek withdrawal from Mesopotamia in 
return for advantages with respect to concessions, especially in the matter of petroleum[...]”. 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1922, vol. II, no. 24, Washington 1938.
100. W.O. 33/1016, op. cit.
101. It was well known that the Soviets granted huge amounts not only to the Turkish 
Nationalists but also for the formation of a League for the liberation of all Mussulman territories 
under European domination, especially those under British control. F.O. 371/5220, E 
6024/1942/44, Sir P. Cox (British Minister) to Curzon, Teheran, 17 April 1920; F.O. 371/6465, E 
1717/1/44, Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office, 7 February 1921; F.O. 371/6345, E 
13559/13559/65, India Office to Foreign Office, Memo on the continuing encourage granted by 
the Soviets to the Muslims for continuance of hostilities against Great Britain, 9 December 1921 ; 
S. R. Sonyel, op. cit., p. 175.
102. The Kemalist-Bolshevist rapprochement influenced a great deal the French policy not 
only vis-à-vis the Cilicia problem but as well as regarding her relations with Nationalists. Paris 
Government considered the close Russo-Turkish relations as a serious obstacle to an eventual 
Franco-Turkish approach. If it did happened so, she would lose the priveleges -economic and 
political-, which she would obtain as the first European Power concluding an agreement with 
Kemalist Turkey. J. Mourelos, op. cit., p. 219.
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Near and Middle East until 1923'03. The explanation of the Soviet stance should 
not be seen only in the light of political theories and moral principles, but in the 
sense that the adoptation of a pro-Turk policy seemed to open up positive 
prospects to promote her interests: the Kemalists were the best organised, strong 
and most promising national movement in Asia, which unavoidably would 
contribute to her own strengthening and recognition of her importance in the 
world diplomatic arena. Moreover, the possession of the Straits by the Turks 
would secure the unimpeded continuation of vital grain imports and in general 
the expansion of Soviet trade, without any interference from the British 
Admiralty. Another relevant factor was the danger which could be posed by the 
presence of a strong Greece which, dominating the Eastern Mediterranean, 
would impede the access of the Soviets to that Sea, whereas at the same time she 
[Greece] would cover the British Empire’s communication line with India103 04. To 
this effect, the Soviet view, which was contrary to that of the British, was clear: 
the Turks should gain footing in Europe or control the Dardanelles105.
Soviet Russia, having suffered the results of free entrance of foreign ships 
into the Black Sea during the civil war, had become an enthusiastic advocate of 
Turkish control over the Straits, unlike Great Britain which was not alarmed by 
the Russian fleet any more, but aimed to restrict Turkish control over the 
Dardanelles and to safeguard the unimpeded entrance and exit of warships of all 
the nations106.
For that reason on 12 September 1922 the Soviets informed the British 
Government that they would not recognize any decision regarding the Straits taken 
in the absence of the Black Sea States107. By virtue of that decision, therefore,
103. E. H. Carr, Ιστορία τής Σοβιετικής "Ενωσης 1917-1923 [History of the Soviet Union], 
voi. 3, Athens 1982, p. 575; The Soviet Government granted precious assistance to Turkey, going 
so far as to ignore even the needs of her people. As Ali Fuad (First Turkey’s Ambassador in 
Moscow) stated, in 1958, the Soviet Government -besides 10 million gold roubles- supplied the 
Kemalists, during the period of national struggle, with large quantities of guns enough to arm three 
divisions. H. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927, Geneva 1966, p. 114.
104. D. Zapantis, Greek-Soviet Relations, 1917-1941, New York 1982, p. 55; H. Kapur, op. 
cit., p. 123.
105. D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 38.
106. About the different point of views on the part of Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union regarding the freedom of the Straits, see H. Nicolson’s Memorandum, D.B.F.P., XVIII, 
Appendix I, pp. 974-983.
107. Karakhan (Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs) in a letter to Curzon stated: “[...] 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Georgia, to whom belongs practically the whole of the Black Sea coast,
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Karakhan on 24th September-replying to a semi-official English statement which 
had described Great Britain, France and Italy as the most interested countries in 
the Straits’ question- despatched a note to the Governments of Great Britain, 
France, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece and Egypt, protesting against the 
assumption that Allied interests should be regarded as more important than those 
of Russia; yet, he pointed out the danger of allowing the present troubles to 
escalate, declaring that the fate of the Straits would have to be decided by 
conference of the Black Sea Powers, and expressed the substance of Soviet view:
Any decision taken without Soviet Russia’s participation108 109and against her 
interests would be neither final nor lasting. All it could cause will be new 
conflicts. The freedom of the Straits which Great Britain has in mind signifies 
only the desire of a strong naval power to control a route vitally necessary to other 
States in order thereby to keep them under a constant threat. This threat is directed 
in the first place against Russia and Turkey"19.
The threat was clear enough, but in vain; one day before the London 
Government had consented to the immediate concession of Eastern Thrace to the 
Turks, consequently the control of the Straits was restored to them.
Ultimately, Great Britain, abandoned by her Allies110, militarily weak, 
embarrassed because of the complicated situation and the conflicting interests 
arising from it, and facing the possibility of a new war with Turkey111, was
cannot admit the right of any other Government to interfere in the settlement of this question of 
the Straits and will maintain the point of view above set out, even if the contrary point of view is 
backed by military or naval superiority”. Footnote 4 in D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 38.
108. The British finally admitted that, because of Russia’s vital commercial and strategic 
interests in this area, no permanent settlement or statute dealing with the Straits, to which Russia 
would not be a party, was possible to be concluded. F.O. 371 /7900, E 10727/27/44, Memorandum 
by A. Forbes regarding the participation of Russia in the future Peace Conference with Turkey, 
27 September 1922.
109. F.O. 371/7895, E 9970/27/44, Karakhan to Curzon, 24 September 1922; See also L. A. 
Mackfie, “The Chanak Affair (September-October 1922)”, Balkan Studies, voi. 20, Thessaloniki 
(1979), p. 339.
110. Not only France, Italy and Dominions but the Balkan States as well refused to send troops 
at Chanak for making a common front with Britain, in order to secure the freedom of the Straits 
and prevent the return of the Turks to Europe. B. C. Busch, op. cit., p. 348; D. Dakin, op. cit., p. 
550.
111. D. Wälder, op. cit., p. 311; On the contrary, in Churchill’s opinion, there has never been
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compelled to retreat on the question of Eastern Thrace"2 and the Gallipoli 
peninsula sacrificing, in this way, “sacred and imperial interest of the British 
Empire”"3.
The statements about freedom “to the populations subjected to the bloody 
tyranny”"4, and the promises of expulsion of the Turks from Europe -since they 
were an “ulcer”"5 for the European civilizaton- affected nobody any more. The 
Anglo-French rivalry in the East, which had caused the Graeco-Turkish war"6, 
reached an end. The note of 23rd September —which paved the way to the 
conclusion of Mudania Armistice on 11 October- made it quite obvious that 
Greece, although exhausted and in urgent need of immediate help, was 
abandoned after she had been acting in Asia Minor for three years essentially as 
a mandatory of the Entente Powers"7; the Greek collapse, however, dragged 
down with her the British security system as it had been built up after the Treaty 
of Sevres and caused many doubts about the British Democracy’s susceptibility"8. 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
any danger to the British forces at Chanak. Kemal advanced against Britain without having no 
intention, however, to fight with her. What he wanted was to frighten her and to compel her to 
retreat, since he knew very well that the war-worn, impoverished and demobilized Britain would 
not stand to fight, while on the other hand, he was aware of the fact that she was the “key” to fulfil 
the Turkish national aspirations. W. S. Churchill, op. cit., pp. 429,433.
112. The British conceded Eastern Thrace although knew well that the majority of its population 
was Greek, so long as in a minute by G. H. Fitzmaurice, on 9 April 1920, was mentioned the official 
Turkish statistics of 1894 forthat region, which gave the following numbers: 304,537 Greeks, 265,359 
Turks and 72,758 Bulgare. F.O. 371/5141, E 2830/139/44; M. L. Smith, op. cit., p. 317.
113. D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 41.
114. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, ed. by B. T. Scott, Washington 
1921, p. 37.
115. D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, voi. 11, New Haven 1939, p. 658.
116. A.Y.E., 1922, A/5/Vl(ij), Π. 468, X. Simopoulos to Foreign Ministry, Constantinople, 25 July 
1922; “This is really a battle between England and France for the possession of Anatolia”. Arnold 
Toynbee citing this remark of a Greek soldier, he agrees that the essence of the afore-said remark 
conveys the true sense of the relations between the Western Powers. A. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 39.
117. Araloff, speaking officially in the name of his Government, in a statement to the 
newspaper Euyud described the Greeks merely as a tool of the Allied Powers. F.O. 371/7889, E 
9444/27/44, S.l.S. to Foreign Office, 12 September 1922; W. S. Churchill, op. cit., p. 384; 
Professor A. Toynbee expressed the view that Greece acted as a British pawn in Anatolia; the 
Greeks putting their army between the British and the constantly growing Kemaiist movement, 
gave them the chance to forward their plans and secure their vital interests into the Middle East. 
A. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 92.
118. W. S. Churchill, ibid.; H. Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 270-271,388; See also D.B.F.P., XVIII, 
no. 34.
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The Allied note of 23 September was undoubtely a great diplomatic success 
for the Turks; it was they alone, of all the nations defeated in 1918, who were 
able to transform themselves into victors and force the Allied Powers to 
negotiate a new peace treaty with them on equal tenus, thereby securing the 
substance of their demands -particularly the recapture of Eastern Thrace- 
without striking a blow.
If, nevertheless, the only loss for the British Lion was to cease roaring at the 
crossroads between Europe and Asia, the tragic disappointment of a whole 
nation, accompanied by a national disaster, pertained exclusively to the Greeks119.
119. Venizelos’ letter to Curzon, D.B.F.P., XVIII, no. 122; As, characteristically, Professors 
Christos Rozakis and Petros Stagos write: “[...] The Greek military expansion to Asia Minor had 
cost Greece dearly and Great Britain almost nothing, for the British not only got the Mosul -which 
with the collapse of the Greek battle front in Asia Minor and the Turks busy chasing and 
slaughtering Greeks, the British were unimpeded when they sent parts of their Arab army, in 
October 1922, into Mesopotamia and occupied Mosul-but also asked Greece, in August 1922, to 
pay back the loans that London had provided two years previously to help pay the exorbitant costs 
of the Greek expedition in Asia Minor”. Ch. Rozakis - P. Stagos, “The Turkish Straits”, in a series 
on International Straits of the World, voi. 9, Dordrecht 1987, p. 33.
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